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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

C. V. BRANHAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
TOM J. JACKSON and VERA M.
JACKSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
9412

BERLIN GLOVE COMPANY, et al.,
Intervenors and Respondents.

Brief of Intervenors and Respondents

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The facts stated in appellant's Brief are correct so far as
the same are stated, but there are these additional facts which
Respondents believe have a bearing on this controversy.
Plaintiff and appellant sought and was granted compensation for the services rendered in selling the property involved
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in this action. Defendants, Tom J. Jackson and Vera M. Jackson,
by their attorney stated that:
"The defendants will stipulate the receipts from
liquidation of the business will be assigned by him
(Jackson) for the benefit of ~is cr~ditors who ~~e. creditors of the Frontier Shop, e1ther 1n the acqms1t1on of
the merchandise, the properties of the business in
connection with the business."
Thereupon the Court stated:
"The record may show that stipulation." (Tr. 12).
The Court then stated the stipulation of Counsel for the parties
as he understood the same. The substance of such statement by
the Court is as follows:
"That the plaintiff may remain in possession of the
goods and merchandise of the Frontier Shop and proceed to liquidate the merchandise on hand and hold the
same in trust, subject to the payment of the necessary
expenses of selling the same, that the surplus would
be subject to the payment of the balance owing to the
plaintiff and then pay the other creditors ratably."
At the time the stipulation was made Attorney Cox represented Salt Lake Hardware Company, Strevell-Paterson Company and Acme Quality Paint Company. That defendants should
execute a written assignment to plaintiff of the merchandise and
fixtures owned by the Frontier Shop. So far as appears no
written assignment was ever made. (Tr. 4-14).
Among the terms of the agreement between plaintiff in the
court below, appellant in this court, and the defendants in the
court below, respondents in this court, are the following:
"D. In the event Jacksons fail, neglect or refuse to
comply with each and all of the covenants herein

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

made for their observance that Branham may declare a breach of this agreement and go into possession of said premises and property as in the
first instance and all payments made and improvements placed thereon shall become the property
of Branham as liquidated damages for said
breach."
"E. In the event of any controversy relative to the
compliance with the terms hereof the party at
fault agrees to pay any damages suffered by the
innocent party, including reasonable attorney fees,
if any attorney is employed on account of such
controversy.''
"F. In the event of forfeiture as provided for herein
Jacksons agree to release to Branham, or his assigns, all property, leases and agreements incorcorporated and referred to herein." (R. 15).
At the trial Branham attempted to identify the merchandise he sold to the Jacksons, but was unable to do so. He did
identify the fixtures. (Trs. -05-148).

ARGUMENT
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT ONE. THE
TRANSACTION WHEREBY BRANHAM TOOK BACK
THE MERCHANDISE AND FIXTURES WHICH HE
THEREFORE SOLD TO JACKSONS IS SUBJECT TO
THE LAW OF THE BULK SALES ACT.
U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 25-2-1, in part provides:

"It shall be the duty of every person who shall bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods,
wares or merchandise in bulk otherwise than in the

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ordinary course of trade and in the regular a?d usual
prosecution of the seller's business, or an entue stock
of merchandise in bulk, or any portion of the property,
furniture, fixtures or equipment or supplies of a hotel,
restaurant, barber shop or other business used in carrying on such business, otherwise than in the regular
course of trade, before paying to the seller any. part
of the purchase price thereof, or delivering any promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness therefore, to demand and receive from such seller a sworn
statement in writing as hereinafter provided of the
names and addresses of all the creditors of the sellers,
together with the amounts of the indebtedness due or
owing by the seller to each of his creditors and it shall
be the duty of the seller to furnish such statement which
shall be verified by oath to substantially the following
effect.''
There follows the form of the oath which provides that the
creditors to be specified in the oath are:
"Creditors holding claims due or which will become
due for or on account of goods, wares or merchandise
purchased upon credit or for the purchase price due or
owing by (seller) to such creditors on account of money
borrowed to carry on the business, which said goods,
:fixtures, equipment or supplies appertain."
It will be seen from the provisions of the Contract between
Branham and the Jacksons above mentioned that the Jacksons
were given possession of the property and the Jacksons in case
of default were required to release to Branham, or his assigns,
all property, leases and agreements incorporated and referred
to herein.
It is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 60-2-2, that title to specific

goods passes when the parties so intend.
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U.C.A. 1953, 60-2-3, lays down the rules that shall be
applied in determining when title to goods passes. It is there
provided that unless a different intention appears the title passes.

"Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract
to sell specified goods in a deliverable state the property
in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is
made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment
or the time of delivery or both is postponed."
The other rules there provided for ascertaining the intention
of the parties as well as the provisions of the contract for the
sale of the property here involved all indicate that it was the
intention of the parties that title should pass to the Jacksons
at the time the contract was entered into by them and Branham.
Moreover, it will be seen from the provisions of the Bulk Sales
Act that the required affidavit must be given when there is a
bargain for a sale.
Thus Branham stood in the same position with respect to
the duty to comply with the Bulk Sales Act as other persons
who buy goods in bulk. There is nothing in that law which
relieves the parties from complying with its terms merely
because Branham had theretofore owned the property here
involved.
Moreover, it will be seen from the terms of the Contract
between Branham and Jackson under date of July 16, 1958,
that in case of breach Branham was entitled to go into possession of said premises and property as in the first instance and
all payments made and improvements placed thereon shall
become the property of Branham as liquidated damages for
such breach. Such language does not even purport to give Bran-
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ham any right to the merchandise that was purchased on credit
by the Jacksons while they were in possession and operated the
store. It will be seen that the trial court found that Branham
was unable to identify the merchandise which he sold to the
Jacksons. Counsel for appellant have not and cannot successfully
attack such Finding.
Counsel for appellant cite 24 Am. fur., page 352, Sec. 204,
in support of the doctrine that the Bulk Sales Act should be
given a strict construction because the same is in derogation
of the common law. Under the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
68-3-2, it is provided that statutes in derogation of the common
law shall be given a liberal construction. That is the holding
of this Court in a number of cases, among them are:

In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757;
State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 423, 226 Par. 904;
Castle v. Delta Land & Water Co., 58 Utah 137,
197 Pac. 584.
Counsel also cite the case of Inglewood State Bank v. Legtman, 275 Pac. 935, in support of his contention that the Bulk
Sales Act has no application to the facts in this case. In our
view that case does not aid appellant. So far as appears, plaintiff
Bank in that case had not sold any merchandise or other property
to defendant, and hence was not one of the parties which the
Act was intended to protect. There was not involved in that
case any claims of creditors of the defendant who had supplied
him with merchandise, nor so far as appears was any merchandise there involved that could not be identified as having been
included in the sale which plaintiff had made and later sought
to cancel under the terms of the contract of sale.

6
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ANSWER TO APPELANT'S POINT TWO. THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND
DECREEING THAT BRANHAM DID NOT HAVE A
PREFERENCE OVER OTHER CREDITORS OF JACKSON.
Under Point II of Appellant's Brief it is argued that
because the contract of sale between plaintiff and defendants
was recorded those who sold merchandise to defendants had
notice of the terms of such sale.
The law seems to be well and uniformly settled that to
make a recorded instrument constructive no~ice it must be made
so by statutory law. The common law does not so provide. It is
said in 45 Am. fur., page 480, Sec. 105, that "in order to be
effective notice to third persons it is obvious that the instrument
recorded must be within the contemplation of the recording law
since it is only through such laws that the record operates as
constructive notice." Numerous cases are there cited in footnotes which support the text. There is nothing in o~r statutory
law which lends support to the claim that those . who sold
merchandise to the Jacksons are chargeable with notice that
any merchandise so sold might be lawfully claimed ·by Branham. Indeed, if such were the law, the Bulk S;ales Act would
be emasculated and the purchaser of a mercantile business on
time. would find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy other
merchandise on credit.
.
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT THREE THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FOLLOW. THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF COUN;.
SEL FOR RESPONDENTS AND INTERVENORS.
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Under Point III of Appellant's Brief it is argued that the
Court was bound to give effect to the stipulation of Respondents.
to the effect that appellant Branham may first deduct and retain
from the receipts received from the sale of the merchandise
here involved the amount owing to him and then divide the
remainder ratably among the other creditors of the Jacksons.
The only creditors at the time the alleged stipulation was made
that were represented by Attorney Cox were: Salt Lake Hardware Company, Strevell-Paterson and Acme Quality Paint Company. (Tr. 4). Obviously Attorney Cox had no authority to
enter into a binding stipulation on behalf of parties that he
might thereafter represent. Moreover, the law is well and uniformly settled that an attorney in the absence of express
authority is without authority to give away the rights of his
clients. The law in such particular is thus stated in 5 Am. fur.,
300, Sec. 70:
"It is a general principle that an attorney cannot by
virtue of his general authority as attorney bind his client
by any act which amounts to a surrender or waiver in
whole or in part of any substantial right of the client
or do any act which will either release his client's debtor
or his surety or substantially jeopardize his interests
in any way."
To the same effect is the law announced in 7 C.J.S. 879.
Among the numerous cases cited to the foregoing texts is Jones,
et al. v. Noble, et al., 39 Pac. (2d) 486, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 316.
Under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the Findings of
Fact and Judgment in this case, the alleged Stipulation is without legal effect because appellant gave no consideration for the
stipulation. It is suggested by appellant that he undertook to
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and did oversee the sale of the merchandise. That is true, but
he asked to be paid for such service and the Court granted him
a preferred claim for all that he claimed leaving no consideration to support the benefits he seeks on account of the alleged
Stipulation.
ANSWER TO POINT FOUR OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF.
The intervenors and respondents join with appellant in the
claim that the Court below erred in Finding and Decreeing
that Thorley Faussett and the Bank of St. George are entitled
to share with the other creditors of Jackson in the fund here
involved.
As to the claim of the Bank, we direct the attention of the
Court to the provision of the Bulk Sales Act, U.C.A, 1953,
25-2-1, which provides for those who are to be mentioned in
the affidavit as being those from whom money has been borrowed to carry on the business. There is no evidence that the
Bank of St. George loaned any money to the Jacksons to carry .
on tlie business in which they were engaged.

CROSS APPEAL
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74(b), the respondents
represented by Counsel who represent respondent, Berlin Glove
Company, et al., cross appeal from that part of the Judgment
wherein and whereby the sum of $350.00 is allowed as attorney
fees paid out of the fund derived from the sale of the merchandise here involved, and also from that part of the Judgment
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awarding to appellant the sum of $911.00 as a preferred claim
for the fixtures sold out of such fund.
ARGUMENT
POINT A
Appellant basis his claim for attorney fees with which to
pay his attorney on the provisions of his Contract with the
defendant Jacksons, which provides that if a party to the contract is in default in complying with the Contract, he shall be
liable for damages, including a reasonable attorney fee, if an
attorney is employed on account of such controversy. (R. 15).
So far as appears no legal services were necessary or were performed in the process of selling the property. The legal services
having been performed solely for the benefit of appellant, there
is no basis for, in effect, requiring defendant to pay for any part
of such service. There is no provision in the Bulk Sales Act
which permits one creditor to recover an attorney fee to be paid
out of the fund derived from the sale of the property, and certainly there is nothing in the Act which gives an attorney a
preferred claim, a part of which is to be paid by a creditor who
has not agreed to pay an attorney fee.
The Act provides that one who bargains for or purchases
merchandise in bulk must cause the purchase money to be applied ratably, except as provided by law, to the payment of
claims for merchandise, furniture and fixtures on credit, and
for money borrowed to carry on the business. If the numerous
creditors of a failing business should hold a note or other agreement for the payment of an attorney fee in the event an account
is placed with an attorney for collection, it may be that all of
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the assets would be consumed in the payment of attorney's fees
and nothing would be left to pay creditors. The basis for
liability to pay an attorney fee is either because of a contract
or by provisions of law. The respondents here have not agreed
to contribute to the payment of an attorney fee to Counsel for
plaintiff, and the Bulk Sales Act contains no such provision.
Branham is a mere creditor of the Jacksons the same as the other
creditors. Branham, the same as the intervenors, at one time
owned property which they sold on credit to the Jacksons. That
the Court erred in granting an attorney fee payable out of the
fees here involved see Fidelity and Co. v. Monroe, 133 Md.
270, 105 A 174.
POINT B
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
APPELLANT A PREFERRED CLAIM IN THE SUM
OF $911.00 ON ACCOUNT OF THE FURNITURE OR
FIXTURES WHICH HE HAD THERETOFORE OWNED
AND SOLD TO DEFENDANTS JACKSONS.
At the trial of this cause plaintiff proceeded upon the
theory that he had a right to all of the property that he had
theretofore owned and conveyed to the Jacksons and sufficient
of the property that the Jacksons had purchased on credit to
pay him in full, including what he owed his attorney. Apparently the trial court adopted such view, but denied Branham
a claim to the merchandise because he was unable to identify
that portion thereof which he had theretofore owned. It is the
contention of these respondents that the Court erred in awarding to Branham a preferred claim of $911.00, the value of the
fixtures.
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There is no language in the Bulk Sales Act which grants
to a creditor of a seller of an entire stock of goods any preferred
claim to that part of a stock of goods that he may be able to
identify as being the goods which he sold. Indeed, if such a
construction were placed on the Act, it would lead to endless
taking of evidence and in the end often lead to a mere guess
as to who formerly owned the various pieces of property. The
express provision of the Act is that the fund derived from the
sale of the property subject to the Bulk Sales Act shall be
divided ratably, except as to those claims preferred by law.
There is nothing in the Act which provides that fixtures used
in the operation of a mercantile store are to be excluded from
the Act or that the proceeds from the sale of fixtures used in
operation of a mercantile store are to be treated as a preferred
claim.
The attention of the Court is again called to those provisions of the Act which provide that every person who shall
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, wares
or merchandise in bulk or any portion of the property, fixtures,
equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or
other business used in carrying on such business.
We are mindful of the rule that when special language
is used to describe property followed by general language, such
general language is limited in its application to property similar
to that described. The form of the affidavit shows that such
rule has no application here, in that, the affidavit makes no distinction between money owing for merchandise, :fixtures, equipment, service performed and money borrowed to carry on the
business. The furniture and fixtures were as much a part of the
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business as was the merchandise. It was sold by Branham to
the Jacksons on credit and taken back by Branham and sold
the same as was the merchandise. That being so, Branham is
not entitled to a preferred claim for the value of the fixtures.
Such is the holding in the case of N. Sakelos and Co. v. Hutchinson Bros. 129 Md. 300, 99 A 357, Berger v. Berger, 271 Wis.
292; 73 N.W. 2nd 94; Parkham v. Thompson Co., 127 Ga. 306
56 SE 460.
The Judgment should be affirmed with the modification
herein urged.
LeROY COX
60 N. Main Street
St. George, Utah
ELIAS HANSEN
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Intervenors
and Respondents
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